25 April 2010

The New Realities - #2: Referential Power


While mega-trends are producing hyper-freedom (see New Realties #1), the nature of power – how it is acquired and deployed – is changing as well.  Traditionally, power has been viewed as exclusively coercive – primarily through negative induction – to serve what the Athenian leader Pericles called “the most fundamental of human motivations: ambition, fear, and self-interest.”  Metrics of demographics, geography, and natural resources dominated.  As Thucydides observed during the Peloponnesian Wars, “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.”[1]  Hard power dominated in a world considered ‘zero-sum,’ where every winner was matched with a loser.  In the latter twentieth century, Harvard’s Joseph Nye introduced the concept of soft power that includes both positive and negative influence by non-matériel means in a plus-sum (win/win) interdependent world.  Today, the world is changing further still, moving toward new processes that recognize the disaggregation and diffusion of power in a global, as opposed to state-centric, framework.  At the center of this phenomenon are the relative decline of U.S. power and the rise of free agency that enables a third form of power: referential power.
            The decline of U.S. power, even if only in a relative sense among other state powers, causes much debate and consternation. After the Soviet Union collapsed the U.S. stood as a ‘unipolar’ power, unrivaled in hard and soft power.  Following 9/11, U.S. foreign policy entered a period of hubristic overstretch that caused a self-inflicted degradation of power.  For many, even suggesting decline is profoundly unpatriotic and inherently foolish.[2]  If we are smart, however, it should not matter.  It is a waste of words and worry.  The paradox of power is that both too little and too much prove to be undesirable.  As foreign policy scholar Michael Mandelbaum recently illustrated, the “power problem” is similar to what economists call the “resource curse,” which occurs in countries that dominate a particular resource, like oil.  They invariably, as do countries with too much power (like the U.S.), adopt policies that weaken the state by over-reliance on the resource, or pernicious use of their power.[3] But again, this should not matter if we recognize our errors and master the concept of referential power.
            So what is referential power? As an admittedly exaggerated illustration, consider what it would be like if all NFL football players immediately became unrestricted free agents and were allowed to form new teams without the influence or control of the NFL, team owners, or the players union. Alliances and teams would be formed around particular interests and capabilities without the constraints imposed by the deposed oligarchy.  Disaggregated and diffused ‘power’ in this sense would be recognized, accumulated, and realigned through negotiation by each player based on how they complemented each other’s skills and capacities – to win the next Super Bowl.  Power in this sense becomes referential, granted by and between participants who rely on one another’s skills and capacities to realize the highest and best application of their own.
            In a much more gradual and constrained fashion, referential power is being deployed in the global system today, negotiated by both state and non-state actors around specific objectives that may be targeted at security, economics, or other social aims.  Actors are perfecting the art of coopetition, of competing to cooperate. China competes very effectively with the International Monetary Fund to cooperate with African political and business leaders on many industrial development projects.  According to Howard W. French of The Atlantic they do so without the heavy-handedness of the U.S. such that they are perceived as “our friends” throughout Africa.[4] As the metrics shift from demographics, geography, and natural resources towards intelligence-based metrics, so does the nature of power.  If the U.S. is to continue to enjoy a differential power advantage over the long term, our leaders must recognize this changing power paradigm. And, this model of networked, referential power can also be applied locally; you are your own free agent.
            On the local level, following the mantra of “think globally, act objectively” one must reconsider how to align with resources and authority to accomplish cherished goals.  Identifying like-minded people (through ‘relational’ networks) and forming a special-purpose, objective-specific network that defines the objective, designs the solution, and drives implementation is the basis of transcendent objectivism … ad-hoc, organically formed alliances where power is granted referentially and resources and authority follow the solution to its realization.  Attraction – not coercion.  Government in this process is not a ‘headliner.’  It plays a supportive role.  Transcendent objectivism is a design that is scalable – up or down – locally or globally – among individuals or states.  At its core is referential power.


[1] John Baylis, and Steve Smith (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics (3rd ed.), (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 50, 167.
[2] For a recent argument against ‘the declinists,’ who question the enduring primacy of American power, see Josef Joffe, “The Default Power: The False Prophecy of America’s Decline.” Foreign Affairs, (September/October, 2009): 21-35.  See also, Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987); and Jeremy Black, Great Powers and the Quest for Hegemony (London: Routledge, 2008).
[3] Michael Mandelbaum, “Overpowered: Questioning the Wisdom of American Restraint.” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2010): 114-119.
[4] Howard W, French, “The Next Empire.” The Atlantic (May 2010): 59-69.

6 comments:

  1. Are you suggesting that "transcendent objectivism … ad-hoc, organically formed alliances where power is granted referentially and resources and authority follow the solution to its realization" is a model current or for the future? If so how would team members (to stay with your NFL analogy) be drafted to fit this "organic model"? Would each nation or interest group be seen as a specialist of some sort that fit a particular organic role? Not sure how such an organic structure exists around achieving solutions. Current alliances exist in Gladstone's idea of common interest but not sure how they unite on achieving solutions. The business world yes, the international order, not so clear.

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  2. Hello,
    When you say "The paradox of power is that both too little and too much prove to be undesirable." That almost makes you out to be a fan of at least some degradation of American power, and your comments favoring China's foreign policy with Africa hints at some dysphoria with American power and foreign policy.

    The concept of referential power is dynamic and interesting, but honestly reminds me a bit of anarchy. How exactly does it differ? Also, are speaking in support of this shift in believing that it is necessary for the future success of America, or are you speaking as a historical witness pointing out a trend that others haven't yet picked up on?
    Thank you for your remarks,
    Kimberly

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  3. Scott:
    Thank you for reading and for your comments/questions.
    Transcendent objectivism is an emerging model of collective action; rising to fill the void of a declining state-centric order. The process of 'drafting' is through self-identification motivated by interest in specific issues/goals. Each actor has resources/skills that offer differentiated capacities that, when combined with others, generate new capacities to execute solutions.
    While this occurs in business, it also does in the international system today, although clumsily and randomly. Technology (think cloud computing) can be applied to the creation of both private and public goods. As governments fail to provide such goods with increasing frequency, those who have a need or interest (for profit or not) will follow thought leaders and 'self-identify' with the objective network.
    Today, I am involved with the development of a media company that will provide (besides entertainment and information) such a platform to spawn transcendent objectivism. A sort of local hybrid of YouTube and Facebook with higher production values and the capacity to monitor/push execution.
    In the end, the needs of people will always drive them to meet those needs. Those are the enduring seeds of (organic) collective action.

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  4. Kimberly:
    Suspend your search for hidden motivations; I'm just a guy trying to shed new light on old issues. My work simply identifies, analyzes, and projects meaningful and/or unique ideas and processes. The US gets it right more often than wrong, but has no monopoly on effective foreign policy. Today, while the US has dominated both hard and soft power it should be no surprise that others chose new forms of competition and cooperation, like China in Africa. In short, when one player has all the marbles, those without play a new game. The US must be mindful of and adaptive to these changes. (But, leaders seldom are until a crisis occurs.)
    The key point of difference between hard power and referential power is worldview and relative power. The system may remain anarchical - assured by legacy notions of sovereignty and a general lack of international law/jurisdiction. But one's assumptions of absolute v. relative power, zero-sum or plus-sum, etc., affects strategies and tactics. For many states and non-state actors, referential power is all they can muster. If enough play the global game that way, the marginal utility (sorry for the economics) of hard power declines. Anarchy may or may not remain a relevant descriptive modality.
    Yes, I employ an historical lens with an interdisciplinary disposition. The trends have historical roots, and yes, I am hopeful we recognize them and produce a framework, as I have attempted to do with my 'invention' of referential power as a term of art, to develop new approaches to foreign policy.
    Thank you for your comments.

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  5. Thank you for your response. I understand a bit more clearly what you're doing here. Your thoughts and ideas are fresh and "edgy" daring to push us outside the limits of more comfortable ways of conceptualizing power, politics, and society. Good luck to you! I'll keep following this blog.

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  6. I hope you do follow, Kimberly. Next up is Complexity, Stategic Inversion, and the Fallacy of the Long Run.

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